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Barnacles, Aristocracy and Truth Denial: Three Not So Beautiful Aspects
of Contemporary Mediation
Abstract
In this article, I examine the themes of self-determination, mediator neutrality, and party empowerment by
exploring three separate topics: barnacles, aristocracy and truth denial.
The first topic, barnacles, refers to the surprising and myriad number of ways that mediation has fully
integrated (insinuated) itself into the U.S. litigation system. Institutionalization, some might argue, is
"beautiful;" indeed, widespread, systematic use of mediation is often offered evidence of success. But I want to
explore a different perspective on the same development-how institutionalization leads to rule exploitation
and spawns its own unique litigation ironies. The second topic, aristocracy, refers to the documentation and
arguments I have made elsewhere in much greater detail regarding the considerable evidence of unjustified
judicial deference to the opinions of class action mediators on settlement process and settlement quality. And,
finally, truth denial. Even the most summary review of mediation texts reveals a stunningly consistent message
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BARNACLES, ARISTROCRACY AND TRUTH




Like any fairy tale, the Sleeping Beauty story has many varia-
tions. Most are far more complicated and sinister than the Dis-
neyesque version that the public is familiar with. The same is true
with mediation. On the surface, it is a beautiful story-self-deter-
mination, mediator neutrality, and party empowerment.' In prac-
tice, especially in litigated cases, something else quite dark is
actually transpiring: parties are literally locked away from one an-
other.2 Mediators routinely testify3 and often actively "assist par-
ties" to see the world as the mediators and the parties' lawyers do.4
* Professor of Law and Senior Fellow, Dispute Resolution Institute, Hamline University
School of Law.
1 See generally ROnERT A. BARUCH BusH & JosiPii B. FoLGER, Tin-, PRSOMISE Or MEDIA-
TION: TH-- TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACII TO CONFLICT (rev. ed. 2004); JAY FoLBEFRo & ALISON
TAYLOR, MIOIIAION: A CoMPI rnu1iNSVI GuiDE TO RiSOLVING CONFLICTS WrrliouT LrlGA-
nON (1984); C nusToi'ii, R W. MooRE, Tiii MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL SRAToGIIS FOR
RESOLVING CONIPLICFr (4th ed. 2014); JosiPH B. Srui IERG & LELA P. LOVE, TiE MIDDLE
VoicE (2d ed. 2012); JOHN WINSLADEl & Gl-RALD MONK, NARRArIVE MEDIArION: A NEw At-
PROACH TO CONFLICt RrSOLUT'ON (2000). See also Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We
Need a Mediator For?": Mediation's "Value-Added' for Negotiators, 12 Otio ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 1, 36 (1996) (describing mediation's ability to enhance "the quality of both party deci-
sion-making and interparty communication, which themselves lead to better quality outcomes
whether or not in the form of settlements"); Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, If Portia Were
a Mediator: An Inquiry Into Justice in Mediation, 9 CI INICAi L. Rt-v. 157 (2002) (extolling medi-
ation for its rich opportunities to implement procedural justice and provide a problem-solving
framework that leads to resolutions far superior to ones derived in more adversarial and conten-
tious adjudicative processes); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 Oito Sr. L.J. 29, 34
(1982) (arguing, among other things, that "[m]ediation offers some clear advantages over adver-
sary processing: it is cheaper, faster, and potentially more hospitable to unique solutions that
take more fully into account nonmaterial interests of the disputants").
2 See, e.g., Eric Galton & Tracy Allen, Don't Torch the Joint Session, 21 DisP'. RI:SOi-. MAo.
25 (2014).
3 See generally James Coben & Peter Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at
Litigation About Mediation, 11 HAiRv. Nucor. L. Ri v. 43, 59-62 (2006); James R. Coben &
Peter N. Thompson, Mediation Litigation Trends: 1999-2007, 1 WoRiD ARB. & Mi-. Ri:v. 395,
401-03 (2007). See generally SARAH R. CoiE tET Al., M I'IA'rION: LAW, POILICY & PRACrICE
§§ 8:1-8:49 (2014-2015).
4 See, e.g., Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The "New" Arbitration, 17 HAV. NcoT. L.
REV. 61 (2012) (describing mediation as a "surrogate" for arbitration, the "functional equivalent
of a private judicial settlement conference"); Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A.
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Settlement is a prime directive and driving force.5 Institutionaliza-
tion through statute and court rule6 has spawned an ultimate judi-
cial irony-an entire body of litigation about the mediation
intended to avoid litigation in the first place.' Judges, many of
whom likely hope to become the "elite" mediators of the future,
are not even sure that the clients need to be in the room at all.8
Is there a Prince Charming to save the beauty? It is an ex-
traordinarily difficult question, especially if we keep in mind that in
many Sleeping Beauty variations the prince is a rapist and often a
bigamist to boot, who impregnates the beauty while she sleeps, and
whose spouse later schemes to cook the beauty and her children.9
In other words: the "solution" (e.g., mandatory mediation as pro-
posed by my colleague Giuseppe De Palo in this symposium's key-
note address 10) may just make things uglier!
Welsh, Is That All There Is?: "The Problem" in Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L.
RrEv. 863, 866 (2008) (describing "the gap between the expansive potential of mediation and the
constricted reality of most court-oriented mediation"); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Substituting Me-
diation for Arbitration: The Growing Market for Evaluative Mediation and What it Means for the
ADR Field, 3 PiEPP. DisP. RESOi. L.J. 111, 113-14 (2002) (bemoaning "evidence of a rising level
of 'market demand' for a form of mediation in which the mediator provides expert case evalua-
tion (assessing strengths and weaknesses of each party's case), substantive settlement recom-
mendations (based on prelictions of court outcomes, for example), and strong pressures to
accept those recommendations, in addition to tightly managing the discussion process").
5 See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush, Staying in Orbit, or Breaking Free: The Relationship of
Mediation to the Courts Over Four Decades, 84 N. D. L. Rev. 705, 727 (2008) (describing the
settlement orientation of court mediation programs as a "mixed picture" of successful institu-
tionalization and "thinning aspirations"); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected
Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 860 (2001) (documenting
how the settlement-driven approach to court-connected mediation, including such things as a
reduced role for disputants, heavier reliance on evaluative interventions, and a near exclusive
focus on monetary settlements "raise very serious problems for perceptions of procedural
justice").
6 See generally Sarah R. Cole et al., Where Mediation is Concerned, Sometimes "There
Ought Not to be a Law!", 20 Disi,. REsOi. MAO. 34 (2014).
7 See generally Coben & Thompson, Disputing Irony, supra note 3, at 43; Coben & Thomp-
son, Mediation Litigation Trends, supra note 3, at 395; see also CoiLE T AL., supra note 3, §§ 5-9.
8 See e.g., Khoday v. Symantec Corp., No. 11-180 (JRT/TNL), 2014 WL 1281600 (D. Minn.
Mar. 13, 2014) (rejecting argument that a class action plaintiff's failure to know about settlement
mediation and not being consulted about mediation established the party's inability to be the
"named" party representative). According to the court, "the party's reliance on counsel to ap-
prise her of the nature of her legal claims is appropriate, and the record does not demonstrate
that any such reliance will prevent her from vigorously prosecuting the action in the best interest
of absent class members or that a conflict of interest exists." Id. at *17.
9 Anthony Lane, Tales Retold: "Maleficent" and "A Million Ways to Die in the West", TIIE
NEW YORKER (June 9, 2014).
10 See Giuseppe De Palo & Romina Canessa, Symposium, Sleeping? Comatose? Only
Mandatory Consideration of Mediation Can Awaken Sleeping Beauty in the European Union, 16
CARDOZO J. CONFHict" RESOL. 713 (2015).
2015] ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY MEDIATION 781
And just to complicate the equation a bit more, the time is
ripe to confront the possibility that mediation contributes to a par-
ticular virulent contemporary public policy challenge: the entitle-
ment people assert to "have their own truth" without concern for
key fact-finding principles (flawed as they might be) that adjudica-
tion highly values-burdens of production, shifting burdens of
proof, the rigorous testing of evidence through cross-examination,
and procedures to qualify experts.
Our society is plagued by outright denial of "objec-
tive fact"' '-examples abound, from climate change 12 to voter sup-
pression13 to Ebola quarantines to anti-vaccination cabals. t4 What
if the ADR movement (and mediation in particular), with its
postmodernist emphasis on self-determination and the all too cava-
lier way that many mediators "dismiss" facts in the rush to recon-
I See generally CHRIS MOONEY, Ti-l REPUBLICAN WAlR ON SCIENCE (2005); Airr VARKI &
DANNY BisowIER, DENIAl: SEi.i-DIEcI-i ION, FAi-si, BELn1FS, AND THE ORIGINS OF i-i HUMAN
MIND (2013); see also J. Roseanau, Science Denial: A Guide for Scientists, TRENDS MICROII-
OLOGY 20(12): 567-69 (2012) (noting that on topics of evolution, climate change, vaccination and
others, "scientists, policymakers, and educators are confronted by organized campaigns to
spread doubt, denial, and rejection of the scientific community's consensus on central scientific
principles. To overcome these threats, scientists not only need to spread scientific knowledge,
but must also address the social drivers of science denial."); Judith Warner, Fact-Free Science,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,2011, http://www.nytimes.com/201 1/02/27/magazine/27FOB-WWLN-t.html?
adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1426266348-/Xkb73TxNshp29bbq8dreg (last visited Mar. ll, 2015)
(bemoaning "a troubling new reality: the rise of the Tea Party and its anti-intellectual, anti-
establishment, anti-elite worldview [that] has brought both a mainstreaming and a radicalization
of antiscientific thought.").
12 See, e.g., Editorial Board, Sen. Jim Inhofe embarrasses the GOP and U.S., WASrl. POST
http://www. washingtonpost.com/opinionsa-snowbaIs-chance/2015/03/01/46e9e00e-bec8-1 1e4-
bdfa-b8e8f594e6ee-story.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2015); ); Justin Gillis, Verbal Warming: Labels
in the Climate Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/17/science/
earth/in-climate-change-whats-in-a-name.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2015); Stephan Lewandow-
sky et al., NASA Faked the Moon Landing - Therefore, (Climate) Science is a Hoax: An Anatomy
of the Motivated Rejection of Science, 24 PsyciHO Sci. 622 (May 2013).
13 See, e.g., Kevin Drum, The Dog That Voted and Other Election Fraud Yarns, MOTI'ZIw
JONES July/August 2012, available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/voter-suppres-
sion-kevin-drum (last visited Mar. 11, 2015); Alexander Keyssar, Voter Suppression Returns:
Voting Rights and Partisan Practices, HARV. MAG., July-Aug. 2012, available at http://
harvardmagazine.com/2012/07/voter-suppression-returns (last visited Mar. 11, 2015); Brendan
Nyhan, Voter Fraud is Rare, But Myth is Widespread, N.Y. Timizs, June 10, 2014, http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/06/l 1/upshot/vote-fraud-is-rare-but-myth-is-widespread.html?abt=0002&abg
=1 (last visited Mar. 11, 2015).
14 See, e.g., Frank Bruni, The Vaccine Lunacy: Disneyland, Measles and Madness, N.Y.
TIMI:S, Jan. 31,2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/01/opinion/sunday/frank-bruni-disneyland-
measles-and-madness.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2015); Angie Drobnic Holan & Aaron
Sharaockman, 2014 Lie of the Year: Exaggerations About Ebola, TAMPA BAY TIMIs PoI.rr-
IcFACIr.COM, Dec. 15, 2014, available at http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2014/dec/
15/2014-lie-year-exaggerations-about-ebola/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2015).
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ciliation and settlement, has actually made our society harder to
govern and complex problems all the more difficult to talk about
and resolve?
To borrow the framing from famed biologist Edward 0. Wil-
son: do we need more enlightenment or more romanticism? 5 The
mediation community, I would assert, speaks with a surprising or-
thodoxy in its resounding support for the latter. It is as if our en-
tire movement, much like our fractured body politic, responds to
factual complexity with a collective shrug and easy slide from "it's
hard to know" to "it's unknowable."
In the brief reflection to follow, I will examine these themes
by exploring three separate topics: barnacles, aristocracy and truth
denial. The first topic, barnacles, refers to the surprising and myr-
iad number of ways that mediation has fully integrated (insinuated)
itself into the U.S. litigation system. Institutionalization, some
might argue, is "beautiful;" indeed, widespread, systematic use of
mediation is often offered evidence of success. 16 But I want to ex-
plore a different perspective on the same development-how insti-
tutionalization leads to rule exploitation and spawns its own unique
litigation ironies. The second topic, aristocracy, refers to the docu-
mentation and arguments I have made elsewhere in much greater
detail17 regarding the considerable evidence of unjustified judicial
deference to the opinions of class action mediators on settlement
process and settlement quality. And, finally, truth denial. Even
the most summary review of mediation texts reveals a stunningly
consistent message about the nature of truth: "there ain't any."
For the reasons hinted at above (and explored in more depth be-
low), I find this foundational assumption of our field to be poten-
tially quite ugly, notwithstanding the allure of its practicality when
interacting with polarized disputants.
15 EDWARD 0. WILSON, TIlE MEANING O HUMAN ExISrENC0 37-38 (2014).
16 See, e.g., Louise Phipps Senft & Cynthia A. Savage, ADR in the Courts: Progress,
Problems, and Possibilities, 108 PENN. STATE. L. REV. 327 (2003); Thomas Stipanowich & J.
Ryan Lamare, Living with "Adr": Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration and
Conflict Management in Fortune 1,000 Corporations, 19 HAlV. Nicor. L. REv. 1 (2013); Donna
Stienstra, ADR in the Federal District Courts: An Initial Report, FI7DERAI JUDICIAL CENTER,
Nov. 16, 2011, available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/adr20ll.pdf/$file/adr2O I .pdf
(last visited Mar. 12, 2015).
17 James R. Coben, Creating a 21st Century Oligarchy: Judicial Abdication to Class Action
Mediators, 5 PENN. STr. Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 162 (2013).
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I. BARNACLES
"Barnacles are encrusters, attaching themselves permanently to a
hard substrate.,
18
Roughly a decade ago, I first began to joke that it might be
possible for me to teach my first-year civil procedure course using
only case law decisions about disputed mediation issues. That is no
longer a hypothetical. It would be easy and here is a course outline
to prove it, each with a single representative case (for many of
these topics, dozens of reported mediation decisions are available
to choose from):' 9
18 Barnacle, WIKIPEDIA, TIn- Fiui, ENCYCILOPEDIA, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Barnacle (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
19 Much of the analysis in this section comes from the mediation treatise that I currently co-
author with Sarah R. Cole, Craig A. McEwen, Nancy H. Rogers, and Peter N. Thompson, as well
as two earlier law review articles I co-wrote with Peter N. Thompson. SARAhI R. COLE , r AL,
MEDIATION: LAW, Poi-icY & PRACTICE (2014-2015); Coben & Thompson, Disputing Irony,
supra note 3; Coben & Thompson, Mediation Litigation Trends, supra note 3, at 395. The
dataset we utilize for this research is derived by searching for cases on Westlaw in the "ALL-
STATES" and "ALLFEDS" databases that include the term "mediat!". As you might imagine,
this search brings up a large number of "hits" on opinions that include some mention of media-
tion (most commonly, the fact of a court referral into the process), but no express discussion of a
disputed mediation problem. The number of total hits per year on the search term has increased
from 1176 in 1999 to 4499 in 2013 (suggesting, if nothing else, considerable increased use of
mediation in American courts). In that same time period, the number of opinions actually decid-
ing a disputed mediation issue has risen from 172 to 802, as illustrated in the chart below:
Year Federal Cases State Cases Total Cases
1999 63 109 172
2000 70 129 200
2001 76 139 215
2002 96 209 301
2003 88 248 335
2004 143 332 475
2005 218 303 523
2006 325 352 677
2007 359 250 609
2008 353 292 645
2009 316 277 593
2010 458 311 769
2011 377 271 648
2012 449 286 735
2013 444 358 802
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Personal Jurisdiction: Glenwood Farms, Inc. v. O'Connor20 (re-
jecting plaintiffs' allegation that a lawyer was subject to personal
jurisdiction for alleged fraudulent and tortious acts in mediation
held out-of-state, which allegedly caused injury in the state);
Diversity Jurisdiction: Webb v. Paccar Leasing Co.21 (conclud-
ing that mediated settlement not approved by state court prior
to removal means the settling non-diverse party remains the de-
fendant in the case precluding removal);
Supplemental Jurisdiction: Watz v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP
22
(refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims following dismissal of federal ADA claims, where the
state court had presided over the suit for almost a year prior to
its removal, and the parties had arranged for facilitative media-
tion in the course of state court proceedings);
Remand: Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc. 3 (remanding case as un-
timely removed, where a letter sent in anticipation of mediation
provided sufficient notice of the amount in controversy to begin
running the thirty-day time period to timely remove the case);
Service of Process: In re Marriage of Craze24 (rejecting hus-
band's argument that personal service of summons and petition
of divorce should be deemed void because served at a mediation
he was invited to from out of state);
Attachment: Thornapple Associates, Inc. v. Sahagen,25 (treating
the failure to participate in mediation as a factor justifying a pre-
judgment attachment in aid of security);
Venue: Robinson v. Eli Lilly and Co.2 6 (citing expertise of dis-
trict's magistrate in settling cases as a factor weighing against
transfer);
Transfer: Shaw Group, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co.
27
(granting venue transfer, for among other reasons, fact that pre-
One particularly interesting trend is the "shift" to a majority of disputed mediation issues
occurring in federal courts, not state (a shift that first occurred in 2006 and continues to this day).
20 Glenwood Farms, Inc. v. O'Connor, 666 F. Supp. 2d 154 (D. Me. 2009).
21 Webb v. Paccar Leasing Co., No. 4:09CV211, 2009 WL 1703207 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
22 Watz v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, No. 12-15245, 2013 WL 1506847, *3 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
23 Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007).
24 In re Marriage of Craze, 133 Wash. App. 1023 (Div. 1 2006).
25 Thornapple Assocs., Inc. v. Sahagen, No. 06 Civ. 6412(JFK), 2007 WL 747861 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
26 Robinson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 535 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.D.C. 2008).
27 Shaw Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. CV-11-279-RMP, 2012 WL 1466779 (E.D.
Wash. 2012).
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mediation and mediation communications and conferences took
place in the transferee jurisdiction);
Erie Doctrine: Mut. of Enumclaw v. Cornhusker Casualty Ins.
Co. 28 (deeming the state's newly adopted version of the Uni-
form Mediation Act to be substantive under Erie and applicable
in lieu of Federal Rule of Evidence 408);
Choice of Law: Mustafa v. Mac's Convenience Stores, LLC
29
(applying the Illinois Uniform Mediation Act to protect media-
tion communications in a case asserted under the Illinois
Human Rights Act, which had been removed to federal court
based exclusively on diversity jurisdiction);
Discovery relevance: Hypertherm, Inc. v. American Torch Tip
Co.3° (deferring ultimate ruling until trial, but questioning
whether evidence of parties' settlement negotiations and media-
tion would be relevant to the question of whether defendant
willfully infringed plaintiff's patents in the past);
Discovery sanctions: Irwin Seating Company v. Intl. Business
Machines Corp.3" (striking expert witnesses and awarding costs
and attorney's fees where the party violated mediation confi-
dentiality by showing trial experts confidential mediation state-
ments and exhibits obtained from the adverse party during
mediation);
Privilege: Folb v. Motion Picture Industry Pension & Health
Plans32 (adopting and applying a blanket federal mediation
privilege to prevent discovery of a mediation brief and related
correspondence);
Work Product: GenOn Mid-Atlantic, LLC v. Stone & Webster,
Inc.33 (applying attorney-work product privilege to protect fi-
nancial spreadsheets and illustrations of charges and change or-
ders prepared by defendant for mediation of construction
dispute);
28 Mut. of Enumclaw v. Cornhusker Cas. Ins. Co., No. CV-07-3101-FVS, 2008 WL 4330313,
*2 (E.D. Wash. 2008).
29 Mustafa v. Mac's Convenience Stores, LLC, No. 13 CV 2951, 2014 WL 1088991 (N.D. Ill.
2014).
30 Hypertherm, Inc. v. Am. Torch Tip Co., No. 05-cv-373-JD, 2009 WL 435324, *5 (D.N.H.
2009).
31 Irwin Seating Co. v. Intl. Bus. Mach. Corp., No. 1:04-CV-568, 2006 WL 3446584 (W.D.
Mich. 2006, afJ'd, 2007 WL 518866 (W.D. Mich. 2007).
32 Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal.
1998), aft'd, 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
33 GenOn Mid-Atlantic, LLC v. Stone & Webster, Inc., No. 11 CV 1299 HB, 2011 WL
6074275 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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Failure to state a claim: Bogopa Service Corp. v. Shulga
34
(deeming allegation that a corporate officer was present at me-
diation insufficient to plausibly infer that the individual person-
ally acted to infringe a trademark);
Waivers of defenses: Sunlight Saunas, Inc. v. Sundance Sauna,
Inc.35 (concluding that defendants did not waive their right to
object to lack of personal jurisdiction by participating in media-
tion before bringing a motion to dismiss which was filed less
than two months after plaintiff joined them as parties);
Joinder: Zurich Capital Markets Inc. v. Coglianese36 (granting
motion to intervene as matter of right, where intervener's par-
ticipation in informal mediation demonstrated his direct interest
in the subject matter of the litigation);
Summary Judgment: Lindsey v. Cook3 7 (vacating grant of sum-
mary judgment enforcing a mediated settlement where the party
challenging enforcement raised a genuine issue of material fact
by asserting that the ground rules set out by the mediator pre-
cluded the creation of any binding obligations and further not-
ing that the trial court erred in taking oral testimony from the
mediator at the summary judgment hearing)
Default: Negron v. Woodhull Hospital8 (vacating default judg-
ment entered because the defendant failed to comply with the
mediator's instruction to bring a principal to the mediation, af-
ter concluding that lesser sanctions were warranted);
Dismissal: Valencia v. French Connection Bakery, Inc.39 (grant-
ing Rule 41(b) dismissal for failure to prosecute, where plaintiffs
failed to, among other things, participate in court-ordered
mediation);
Appeals: Johnson Specialized Transp., Inc. v. Metzger41 (inter-
preting trial court order to mediate reimbursement of cleanup
claims before returning to court for further action as evidence
that trial court decisions were interlocutory in nature and not
final appealable orders); and
34 Bogopa Serv. Corp. v. Shulga, No. 3:08cv365, 2009 WL 1628881 (W.D. N.C. 2009).
35 Sunlight Saunas, Inc. v. Sundance Sauna, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (D. Kan. 2006).
36 Zurich Capital Mkt. Inc. v. Coglianese, 236 F.R.D. 379 (N.D. IIl. 2006).
37 Lindsey v. Cook, 139 Idaho 568, 82 P.3d 850 (2003).
38 Negron v. Woodhull Hosp., 173 Fed. Appx. 77 (2d Cir. 2006).
39 Valencia v. French Connection Bakery, Inc., No. C 07-1118 PVT, 2008 WL 152228 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 15, 2008).
40 Johnson Specialized Transp., Inc. v. Metzger, No. C-49-05, 2011 WL 3687428 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2011).
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Res judicata: City of Demorest v. Roberts & Dunahoo Proper-
ties4' (applying collateral estoppel to bar action which included
issues settled in a prior mediation, the terms of which were in-
corporated into a consent judgment of the court).
"Beautiful"-at least from the perspective of a civil procedure
wonk! For many (okay, admittedly, most others), beautiful would
not be the first word to come to mind. But now to push the point
for you remaining agnostics, here are five categories of mediation
litigation that strongly suggest that the "encrusting" of mediation
into the contemporary litigation system is anything but "beautiful."
A. The Dog Ate My Paper
Lawyers are creative. Give a lawyer a rule and it is very likely
an excuse for not following it will immediately emerge. Mediation,
and the burdens it imposes on litigants, has evolved into an "all-
purpose" excuse.42 By way of example, belief that a case would
settle in mediation has been offered to justify, among other things,
late amendment of a complaint;43 late filings of motions;4 4 exten-
sions of time for discovery;45 and requests for trial continuance.
46
Mediation efforts are routinely offered up as a defense against
sanctions for failure to designate witnesses and exhibits (and a vari-
ety of other discovery failures).47
41 City of Demorest v. Roberts & Dunahoo Properties, LLC, 288 Ga. App. 708, 655 S.E.2d
617 (2007).
42 For detailed analysis, see COLE lT Al., supra note 3, § 5:12.
43 See, e.g., iMedicor, Inc v. Access Pharm., Inc., 290 F.R.D. 50, 52-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (re-
jecting party's justification that it waited to amend until completion of mediation so as to avoid
"needlessly taking up the court's time" and noting instead that "[it would have been more effi-
cient to put all of the possible claims on the table while the parties were negotiating not only to
better inform the parties' discussions, but also to resolve all possible claims at the same time.").
44 See, e.g., Johnson v. Eldridge, 799 N.E.2d 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that a settle-
ment offer made three months late because parties were awaiting mediation qualified as good
cause for extension of time for purposes of making a required timely written offer of settlement
under the Indiana Tort Prejudgment Interest statute).
45 See, e.g., Wieters v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 58 Fed. Appx. 40, 44 (4th Cir. 2003) (affirming
district court refusal to grant extension of time for discovery where moving party argued that
basis for extension was that "valuable time had been consumed in a lengthy mediation process").
46 See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 387 S.W.3d 769, 772 (Tex. App. El Paso 2012) (denying
motion to continue trial where, among other things, party failed to attend mediation).
47 See, e.g., Woodhull v. County of Kent, No. 1:04-CV-203, 2006 WL 708662 (W.D. Mich.
2006) (holding that submitting expert witness statements as exhibits to a Facilitative Mediation
Case Summary satisfied the procedural requirements for mandatory expert disclosure).
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1. The "Backfire" of Unintended Consequences
Participation (or non-participation) in mediation has come
back to "bite" parties with a surprisingly diverse set of conse-
quences, 48 ranging from influencing judicial evaluation of the pro-
priety of an injunction,49 to lack of entitlement to a restraining
order,5" to denial of the right to an in-person deposition.5'
2. The Substantive Surprise
Unfortunately for some litigants, their actions (or non-actions)
in mediation are also invoked by judges to help justify decisions on
the underlying substantive claims.52 Thus, for example, in Hodge v.
ClosetMaid Corp. 53 the court cited plaintiff's attendance at media-
tion conferences where she exercised settlement authority on be-
half of her employer as evidence that she was an exempt employee
not entitled to overtime compensation. In Logan v. Potter,54 the
court rejected plaintiff's claim that defendant failed to accommo-
date his condition, in part because defendant engaged in mediation
with plaintiff. And in In re LC.,5 a father's refusal to mediate a
visitation dispute was invoked to demonstrate his inability or re-
fusal to work in the best interest of the children thereby supporting
an award of physical custody to the mother.
3. Traps for the Unwary
Still other litigants fall into a variety of "traps for the unwary"
involving waivers (or unexpected tolling) of relevant statutes of
limitations, unintended waivers of rights and notice of claims, and
exhaustion of remedies. 56 For example, in Michelson v. Mid-Cen-
48 For detailed analysis and numerous examples, see COLE Tr AL., supra note 3, § 5:12.
49 Chanel, Inc. v. Pu, No. 07-2502-KGS, 2009 WL 722050 (D. Kan. 2009) (citing failure to
participate meaningfully in mediation as evidence of defendant's continuing disregard of plain-
tiff's rights, justifying injunction against trademark infringement).
50 Sanchez v. Sanchez, No. 10-CV-1628 JLS (RBB), 2010 WL 4790179, *5 (S.D. Cal. 2010)
(citing request for continuance to permit mediation as evidence suggesting lack of imminent
harm).
51 Palma v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., No. 07-22913-CIV, 2009 WL 653305 (S.D. Fla.
2009) (noting opportunity to view demeanor in mediation as rationale for denying in-person
deposition)
52 For detailed analysis see COL E HT AL., supra note 3, § 5:12.
53 Hodge v. ClosetMaid Corp., No. 5:13-cv-62-Oc-1OPRL, 2014 WL 1328967, *9 (M.D. Fla.
2014).
54 Logan v. Potter, No. 06-297, 2007 WL 1652268, *12 (D.N.J. 2007).
55 In re I.C., No. B217758, 2010 WL 427129, *25 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2010).
56 For detailed analysis see COLE ET Al., supra note 3, at § 5:15.
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tury Ins. Co.,57 the court rejected plaintiff's argument that the stat-
ute of limitations for an insurance claim should have remain tolled
until she was formally notified that the mediation process was en-
ded, as opposed to twelve days earlier when mediation failed. 58
And in Stipp v. St. Charles,59 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held
that a party waived its objection to venue by, among other things,
beginning mediation. More notorious, is the case of Haghighi v.
Russian-American Broadcasting," where the parties' failure to in-
clude statutorily-mandated "magic words" in their settlement
agreement led to years of litigation about its enforcement.6"
4. A Source of Entirely New Claims
And, sadly, mediation itself is the source not only of litigation
about the mediation and its impact within the original dispute, but
also a source of entirely new claims, ranging from lawyer malprac-
tice62 to discrimination63 to insurance bad faith.64
And all of this lack of beauty does not even include the vast
bulk of mediation litigation-the inevitable battles about enforce-
ment of mediated settlements,65 sanctions disputes regarding medi-
57 Michelson v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 83 Cal. App. 4th 450, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 804 (2d Dist.
2000).
58 Id. at 459, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 809 (noting that the relevant statute requires no written
notification to trigger the end of the tolling period and instead simply provides that tolling ends
when mediation is "completed").
59 Stipp v. St. Charles, 291 S.W.3d 720 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).
60 Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting Co., 173 F.3d 1086, 1087-88 (8th Cir. 1999);
Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting Co., 945 F. Supp. 1233, 1234-35 (D. Minn. 1996),
certified question answered, 577 N.W.2d 927 (Minn. 1998) and rev'd, 173 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir.
1999) (refusing to enforce an otherwise fair mediation agreement signed by the parties that
stated it was a "Full and Final Mutual Release of All Claims;" but did not include the magic
words that "it was binding").
61 See James R. Cohen & Peter N. Thompson, The Haghighi Trilogy and the Minnesota Civil
Mediation Act: Exposing a Phantom Menace Casting a Pall Over the Development of A DR in
Minnesota, 20 HAMIINI1 J. Pun. L. & Poi'y 299, 324 (1999) (arguing that the insistence on
technical terms in mediated settlement agreements contrary to community expectations creates
uncertainty in whether mediation settlements are enforceable "casting a pall over the develop-
ment of ADR in Minnesota").
62 For detailed analysis see Coji-. Er AL., supra note 3, § 12:4.
63 Id. § 5:19.
64 Id. § 5:18.
65 Id. §§ 7:1-7:20.
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ation behavior,66 and bitter fights about mediation costs and
entitlement to attorney's fees.67
Despite my better judgment, I will close with a positive: the
arguably "beautiful" fact that there is virtually no litigation about
mediators themselves,68 notwithstanding the considerable ink
spilled over the last three decades in academic journals and contin-
uing legal education materials.69 Perhaps closing on a positive note
makes sense: these "barnacles" are an annoyance and certainly cre-
ate inefficiencies. In other words, they aren't pretty; but I am will-
ing to concede that "ugly" might be too strong a word. That label
is better reserved for aristocracy and truth denial.
II. ARISTOCRACY
They are purportedly selected for their "virtue"-judgment, neu-
trality, expertise-yet rewarded as if they are participants in inter-
national deal-making. In more sociological terms, the symbolic
capital acquired through a career of public service or scholarship
is translated into a substantial cash value in international
arbitration.V7
With the quote above, Yves Dezaly and Bryant Garth neatly
described the "very select and elite group of individuals"' 71 eligible
to serve as international arbitrators. I have systematically argued
elsewhere72 that this same mantle has been passed to the elite
group of class action mediators and "the symbolic power that led to
their selection by disputing parties has fostered especially lazy judi-
66 Id. §§ 9:3-9:16.
67 Id. §§ 9:17-9:20. Just by way of example, courts routinely grapple with how many attor-
neys are necessary to effectively represent a party in mediation. Generally speaking, more than
two is problematic! Id. § 9:20 n. 8-13 (and cases cited therein).
68 COLE ET AL., supra note 3, § 7:10. Lawyers, on the other hand, have fared far worse, with
malpractice actions and ethics complaints brought against them for mediation acts and omissions
ranging from disclosure of privileged communications to failure to schedule or pay for media-
tions to seeking to enforce mediated settlements with client consent. For detailed analysis and
case examples, see COLE F7T AL., supra note 3, § 12:4.
69 See, e.g., Scott H. Hughes, Mediator Immunity: The Misguided and Inequitable Shifting of
Risk, 83 OR. L. REV. 107 (2004); Michael Moffitt, Ten Ways to Get Sued: A Guide for Mediators,
8 HARV. NEGo'r. L. RiEv. 81 (2003); Joseph P. Stulberg, Mediator Immunity, 2 OHio ST. J. ON
DisiP. RiESOL. 85 (1986). See generally COLE i- r AL., supra note 3, §§ 11:10.
70 YvE.s DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DE ALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMIER-
CIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTIION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LFGAl ORDER 8 (1996).
71 Id.
72 Coben, supra note 17. Much of the analysis for this section is drawn from this earlier
article.
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cial reasoning, and unjustified judicial deference in a context where
vulnerable third parties (class members not at the bargaining table)
deserve better from our judicial system."73 What exactly am I re-
ferring to? In dozens of decisions each year, federal and to a lesser
extent, state court judges cite the involvement of a private media-
tor as evidence that bargaining in a class action case was conducted
at arms-length and without collusion between the parties. 74  The
degree of deference ranges from the sublime to the ridiculous:
"[A] court-appointed mediator's involvement in pre-certifica-
tion settlement negotiations helps to ensure that the proceedings
were free of collusion and undue pressure;,
75
"The assistance of an experienced mediator .. reinforces that
the Settlement Agreement is non-collusive;,
76
"[T]he participation of an independent mediator in settlement
negotiations virtually insures that the negotiations were con-
ducted at arm's length and without collusion between the par-
ties"; 77 and
"The assistance of an experienced mediator in the settlement
process confirms that the settlement is non-collusive.,
78
Surprisingly, courts not only cite mediator testimony on process
fairness, they routinely detail and credit mediator endorsement of
settlement quality, in effect allowing the broker of the settlement
73 Id. at 162-63.
74 For recent examples, see, e.g., In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., MDL No. 1668, No. 04-1639
(RJL), 2013 WL6383000, *4 (D. D.C. Dec. 6, 2013) (citing mediator letter attesting that, "in [his]
professional opinion, the negotiations leading to this proposed settlement were very concen-
trated and conducted at arms' length," and "[a]lI of the Parties' counsel were not only profes-
sionals, but also clearly possessed the sufficient discovery and research materials to make
informed decisions"); In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 965 F.Supp.2d 369, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(observing that "[firom his front row seat, the mediator concluded that "negotiations in this case
were hard fought and at arm's-length at all times"); In re LivingSocial Mktg. and Sales Practice
Litig., 298 F.R.D. 1, 11 (D. D.C. 2013) (reciting mediator testimony that "ft]here was never any
type of collusion between the Parties in any of the negotiations," and that the parties' negotia-
tions "were intense at every step of the way, and the Parties vigorously advocated for their
respective positions"). For historical documentation of this practice and many more case cita-
tions and parentheticals, see James R. Cohen, supra note 16, at 167-72; see also Coi.7 IT Al.,
supra note 3, § 7:17 n.26-33.
75 D'Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F.3d 78, 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
76 Diaz v. E. Locating Serv. Inc., No. 10 Civ. 4082(JCF), 2010 WL 2945556, *1 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (emphasis added).
77 Bert v. AK Steel Corp., No. l:02-CV-467, 2008 WL 4693747, *2 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (empha-
sis added).
78 Satchell v. Fed. Express Corp., Nos. C03-2659 SI, C 03-2878 SI, 2007 WL 1114010, *4
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (emphasis added).
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to opine on its substantive merits.79 Sometimes it is a passing refer-
ence, for example a mention "that the experienced mediator 'unre-
servedly' recommends the Settlement." 80 But often, the mediators
volunteer much more, including their own comparison of the fair-
ness of the settlement they brokered to other settlements or pre-
dicted litigation outcomes:
[I]t is my opinion that the [S]ettlement[s] w[ere] achieved
through a fair and reasonable process and [are] in the best inter-
est of the class ... the court system and the mediation process
worked exactly as they are supposed to work at their best; a
consensual resolution was achieved based on full information
and honest negotiation between well-represented and evenly
balanced parties;"
81
"The settlement "was arrived at through arm's length negotia-
tions by counsel who were skilled and knowledgeable about the
facts and law of this case," and it was "fair, reasonable and ade-
quate in light of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and
defenses and the risks of establishing liability and damages;"82
"All members of the defined class ... were adequately repre-
sented during the lengthy course of the mediation" and "[a]ll
sides exhibited great skill and determination .. .resulting in a
comprehensive settlement of a very complex matter which I be-
lieve is the fairest resolution which could be obtained;,
83
"The separately negotiated attorneys' fees and expenses agree-
ment was negotiated in good faith and is fair and reasonable and
within the range of fees paid in similar shareholder derivative
cases:"
8 4
"[T]he settlement reached between the parties was the product
of arm's-length and good faith negotiations . . ." [and] "is non-
collusive, fair and reasonable to all parties and provides signifi-
cant benefits to the Settlement Class."85
79 For a detailed narrative see Coben, supra note 17, at 172-74.
80 Moore v. Verizon Commc'n, Inc., No: C 09-1823 SBA, 2013 WL 4610764, *7 (N.D. Cal.
2013).
81 In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F.Supp.2d 503, 509-10 (E.D.N.Y.
2003) (emphasis added).
82 Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 957 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).
83 In re Literary Works in Electronic Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242, 263 (2nd Cir.
2011) (emphasis added).
84 In re MRV Commc'n, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. CV 08-03800 GAF (MANx), 2013 WL
2897874, *6 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (emphasis added).
85 Johansson-Dohrmann v. CBR Systems, Inc., No. 12-cv-1115-MMA (BGS), 2013 WL
3864341, *8 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (emphasis added).
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And, to make things worse, in some cases, this testimony is en-
couraged in strategic direct rebuttal to objections regarding the
merits of the settlement offered by class members absent from the
mediation.86
Courts utilizing this testimony never explain in any satisfac-
tory manner why they choose to credit it.87 The sobering reality is
that this judicial deference has its foundation in a modern aristoc-
racy. These mediators are admired and not to be doubted simply
because of their character and reputation."8 In other words, "we
know these are good people."89 When wearing my more cynical
hat, I suspect as well, "this is a club that I soon hope to join."
Why care about this problem? After all, these elite class ac-
tion mediators are amazingly talented professionals, no doubt
some of the very best lawyers and problem-solvers in our nation's
history. Haven't they earned the right to be trusted? I have a sim-
ple response: trust based on individual "virtue" may well be a good
reason to choose a particular neutral but it is a poor criterion for
86 In 2002, Richard T. Seymour endorsed this approach as a particular strategic benefit of
mediated class actions. See Richard T. Seymour, Mediating Class Actions: A Plaintiff Lawyer's
View, in How ADR WORKS 389-411 (Norman Brand ed. 2002). Seymour advised that "[t]he
mediator can provide a direct response to class members claiming improper collusion between
the plaintiffs and the defendant in the settlement by testifying to the arms-length character of the
negotiations and the vigor with which the parties pursued their competing goals." Id. at 392. A
stark "no-apologies" example of implementing the strategy can be seen in Lipuma v. Am. Ex-
press Co. where the mediator's affidavit stated:
3. It has come to my attention that counsel for a purported class member has alleged
that counsel for the parties "colluded" in reaching the settlement. I submit this affi-
davit to specifically address those allegations. Based on my observations as mediator,
such allegations are entirely baseless. I observed no signs of collusion or unethical
conduct.
4. It is my observation that Defendants and Plaintiffs were represented by highly
competent, reputable and ethical counsel who negotiated vigorously and at arms-
length for their respective party's interests.
Lipuma v. Am. Express Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
87 A number of rationales are vaguely implied in the case law, including the erroneous as-
sumptions that mediators have a duty to stop collusion or fraud, that mediators have an ethical
responsibility to protect the interests of third parties, or that the threat of mediator testimony
serves as deterrence against bad acts. See Coben, supra note 17, at 175-82.
88 For detailed discussion and case examples illustrating the effusive praise courts use to
describe the mediators they rely on, see Coben, supra note 17, at 183-85 (documenting approba-
tion ranging from "experienced" to "nationally recognized" to "indisputably exquisitely quali-
fied" and all kinds of variation in between).
89 See, e.g., In re Cmty. Bank of N. Virginia, MDL No. 1674, No. 03-0425, 2008 WL 3833271,
*11 (W.D. Pa., 2008) (concluding a settlement was entitled to a presumption of fairness based on
the mediator's testimony, noting that the mediator was "well known to the court, having served
on this court as well as the court of appeals, with distinction. His integrity is beyond reproach
and no credible attack has been, or could be, lodged against his assurances. ") (emphasis added).
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the judicial system to base the administration of power on, espe-
cially when that exercise occurs as it does in mediation's private
rooms without controls of any formal procedure or rules. The lack
of accountability and transparency leaves one with a distinctly un-
democratic feeling. 90 As I wrote in my earlier article, "the intersec-
tion of private rights (the parties' choice to have the mediator they
want and the process they want) does not mesh neatly with the
public rights at stake in the class action settlement approval pro-
cess-the necessity to protect the interests of the absent class
members." 91
There are voices of reason in this wilderness, most admirably
Kakani v. Oracle Corp. ,92 where, in rejecting the parties' joint mo-
tion for preliminary approval of a mediated class action settlement,
the Honorable William Alsup pointedly opined:
It is... no answer to say that a private mediator helped frame the
proposal. Such a mediator is paid to help the immediate parties
reach a deal. Mediators do not adjudicate the merits. They are
masters in the art of what is negotiable. It matters little to the
mediator whether a deal is collusive as long as a deal is reached.
Such a mediator has no fiduciary duty to anyone, much less those
not at the table.93
Sadly, Judge Alsup has been joined by only a small number of ju-
rists, but none willing to so precisely name the problem with any
sense of the concern I think it deserves.94
90 For a trenchant discussion of democracy and alternative dispute resolution, see Richard C.
Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW AN1 CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 279, 281 (2004) (noting "[w]ith rare exception ... the question of the relationship
between arbitration and democracy, or for that matter, democracy and dispute resolution gener-
ally ... has simply fallen through the cracks of scholarly attention").
91 Coben, supra note 17, at 187. Moreover, this disconnect is profoundly compounded by the
inability of class objectors to get access to mediation information. See generally WILJAAM B.
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACIGIONS § 11:57 (4th ed. 2008) (noting that "[t]he
objector does not have an absolute right to discovery and presentation of evidence.").
92 Kakani v. Oracle Corp., No. C 06-06493 WHA, 2007 WL 2221073 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
93 Id. at *11 (rejecting the mediated settlement of alleged failure to pay overtime claims as
a "bonanza" for the company and for class counsel, where it, among other things, provided an
extraordinarily short time period for workers to claim settlement benefits and provided that
payments unclaimed by class members were to be retained by the defendant notwithstanding
that plaintiff's counsel would receive a set multi-million dollar fee regardless of how many claims
were actually submitted by class members).
94 See, e.g., In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 948 (9th Cir. 2011)
(vacating trial court approval of a class action attorney fee award and mediated settlement
where the gross disproportion between the class award and the negotiated fee award raised at
least an inference of unfairness, and pointing out that "the mere presence of a neutral mediator,
though a factor weighing in favor of a finding of non-collusiveness, is not on its own dispositive
of whether the end product is a fair, adequate, and reasonable settlement agreement"); Acosta v.
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Will this anointing of a mediator aristocracy spread beyond
the specialized context of class action cases? That remains to be
seen. If it does, a "sleeping" mediation may well awaken, but will
be far uglier than when she first fell asleep.
III. TRUTH DENIAL
"It's like pointing to an apple and saying, 'this is an orange.' It
takes practice to train your mind to be able to do it.... You have
to convince yourself, not so much that an apple is an orange, but
that there is no such thing as what the object 'really' is .... Or
rather, that on the question of what the object is, there are *only*
competing answers-no objective fact of the matter." David
Roberts
95
In the late 1990s, toward the end of my first decade of media-
tion work, I first read Some Trouble with COWS, 9 6 Beth Roy's in-
triguing account of conflict in a remote Bangladeshi village. I
found myself immediately drawn to the following two sentences:
The stories I heard ... were not about "what happened" (itself a
questionable concept). What I heard was how people saw what
happened, or, rather, how people remembered what they saw, or
rather, how they talked about what they remembered, or rather,
how they talked to me about what they remembered-or,
rather, what I heard people say to me about what they
remembered.97
The description aptly captured my experience sitting in conflict and
listening to disputants' stories. I suspect many mediators would
feel the same way. At the time, I did not stop to reflect on just how
adroitly it summed up the fundamental postmodernist assumptions
Trans Union, LLC, 243 F.R.D. 377, 399 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (lauding the mediator's involvement in
the case but pointing out that he was essentially duped by the parties into believing that hard
trade-offs were made during the mediation process he brokered and wholeheartedly endorsed,
when in fact, the trade-offs had been negotiated secretly by the parties before the mediation
even began); In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 157 n. 44 (Bkrtcy. D. Del 2011) (stating that "a
proposed settlement must stand or fall on its own merits and is not dependent upon the identity
of the Mediator.").
95 Grist Staff, David Roberts Explains Postmodern Conservatism in 36 Tweets, GRIST (Nov.
11, 2014), available at http://grist.org/politics/david-roberts-explains-postmodern-conservatism-
in-36-tweets/ (last visited March 6, 2015) (citing the grant of certiorari in King v. Burwell, 135
S.Ct. 475 (2014) "as a crucial turning point in the American conservative movement's ability to
assert that black is white and up is down").
96 BETII Roy, SoMrz TROtumHi WITH Cows (1994).
97 Id. at 5.
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about truth that mediation literature offers up unabashedly, and
for the most part, without dissent. I divide the thinking into four
categories, each illustrated with quotes from well-known mediation
texts:
A. Focus on the Future, Not the Past
In mediation land, there is the past-a troubled and confusing
place, which is contrasted with a much more attractive future-one
that parties can control and shape. For example, in the newest edi-
tion of their Mediation Theory and Practice9 8 casebook, James Al-
fini, Sharon B. Press, and Joseph B. Stulberg advise:
Focus on the Future. It is helpful to remind parties that they
cannot change what happened in the past, but they can decide
how they want things to be in the future. As a means of com-
parison, the traditional litigation process focuses on the past, de-
termining what happened, and who was wrong or right. In
mediations involving an ongoing relationship, what happened in
the past need only be relevant in helping parties determine how
they want to behave in the future.9 9
In the 2012 revised edition of The Middle Voice,'0 Stulberg and
Love instruct us:
Focus on the future, not the past. A mediator helps parties shape
their future. Past events influence that design. But the mediator
must remember that no one can change what has happened and
that the impact of past events becomes less dominant as their
details become ambiguous and disputed. A mediator must not
let the parties' competing visions of their past paralyze them." 0 t
Lawrence Boulle, in Mediation: Skills and Techniques,'
0 2
recommends:
98 JAMES J. ALFINI, SHARON B. PRESS & JOSiPH B. STULI BERG, MEDIATION TIInORY AND
PRACriCE (3d ed. 2013).
99 Id. at 125. Even the drafters of the Uniform Mediation Act saw fit to emphasize that
mediation is not a truth-seeking process. See UNIE. MImrnATION Acr prefatory note 1 (2003)
("Although it is important to note that mediation is not essentially a truth-seeking process in our
justice system such as discovery, if the parties realize that they will be unable to show that an-
other party lied during mediation, they can ask for corroboration of the statement made in medi-
ation prior to relying on the accuracy of it.").
100 SrULBERG & LOVE., supra note 1.
101 Id. at 96.
102 LAWRENCE BouiLE, MEI)IATION: SKInLS AND TiC-INIQuJ.S (2001).
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Getting out of the past into the future .... While the mediation
might have to devote some time to dealing with prior events, it
is not obsessed with the past and with historical facts, as are
other forms of dispute resolution such as adjudication. The me-
diator is able to redirect the parties' attention from a negative
and destructive past to a future which can be different and more
attractive.
103
In the 1984 classic, Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to Resolv-
ing Conflicts Without Litigation," Jay Folberg and Alison Taylor
noted:
Mediation is more concerned with how the parties will resolve
the conflict and create a plan than with personal histories. In
this respect, mediation is cognitive and behavioral in perspective
rather than existential. It is more concerned with the present
and the future than with the past.
10 5
Folberg and Taylor went on to propose that one of eight proposi-
tions "for a system of shared, unified beliefs for mediators" should
be that "[i]n mediation the past history of the participants is only
important in relation to the present or as a basis for predicting fu-
ture needs, intentions, abilities, and reactions to decisions.
°1 0 6
To be fair, some do push back strongly against this reductionist
view of the past. As Joseph P. Folger and Robert A. Baruch Bush
wrote in 1996, an important hallmark of transformative practice "is
a willingness to mine the past for its value to the present":
0 7
Hallmark 8: "Discussing the past has value to the present": Being
responsive to parties' statements about past events .... Parties'
comments about the past can be highly relevant to the present,
in the unfolding conflict interaction. In talking about what hap-
pened, each disputant reveals important points about how he or
she sees, and wants to be seen by, the other party .... If third
parties view the history of conflict as evil, as something that the
103 Id. at 46. See also MARK S. UMBRIIT, MFDIATING INTIRPFRSONAL CONFLI(cS: A PATl-
WAY TO PEACi- 20 (1995) (describing mediation as "a time limited problem solving intervention
that is proving to be effective in a wide range of interpersonal disputes and conflicts. It does not
focus primarily on past behavior and specific weaknesses or emotional problems of individuals.
Instead, mediation is future oriented and builds upon the strengths of the people in mediation to
work together with each other in resolving the conflict.").
104 JAY FOLBIERG AN) AI.ISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHIENSIVE GuID, T0 REsoiLv-
INC CONILICFIS WITHoUT LITIGATION (1984).
105 Id. at 8-9.
106 Id. at 13-14.
107 Robert Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, Transformative Mediation and Third-Party Inter-
vention: Ten Hallmarks of a Transformative Approach to Practice, 13 M I)IATION Q. 263, 274
(1996).
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session quickly must move beyond, then important opportuni-
ties for empowerment and recognition will almost certainly be
missed.1 °8
B. Truth in Stories
Still other mediation writers emphasize the importance of
"stories" and the fairy tale imagery they evoke (a particularly apt
metaphor given our symposium title). In the introductory chapter
of Resolving Personal and Organizational Conflict: Stories of
Transformation and Forgiveness,10 9 Kenneth Cloke and Joan Gold-
smith share an ancient piece of Jewish wisdom:
"What is truer than the truth?" It answers, "The story." How is
it possible for a story to be "truer than the truth"? Stories con-
tain not only the truth of factual description, of events, people,
and places, but also fragments of the storyteller's truth. They
expose the shadow that falls between emotion and response."' 0
Cloke and Goldsmith invite conflict professionals to "hear as fairy
tales all the stories of conflict that you will ever be told, not be-
cause they are untrue but because their truths are hidden deep
within their narrative structure."'' The issue of truth or falsity,
assert Cloke and Goldsmith:
takes on a different meaning in mediation. When people hear
stories told about them by their opponents, they often respond,
"That's not true!" And when their opponents hear stories told
about them, they offer the same protest. Our experience is that
no conflict story is either completely true or completely false.
No one tells the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth
while embroiled in conflict. Indeed, it is impossible to do so,
because no one is completely omniscient or empathic, and no
one can come close to knowing the whole truth. The oath peo-
ple take in court to tell the truth actually forces them to lie.
108 Id. at 273-74 (noting, as I believe to be the case, that many mediation "how-to manuals
advise third parties to focus on the future, not the past, and to encourage parties to keep their
discussion of past events to a minimum" just as the same guides "advise against encouraging
expression of emotions.").
109 KENNETHI CLOKE & JOAN GOLDSMrIH, RESOLVING PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL
CONII IcrI: SroRIrs OF TRANSFORMATION AND FORGIVENESS (2000).
110 Id. at 1.
111 Id. at xv. The authors also assert "that every story about conflict is, at one level, a fairy
tale. Each tale of conflict, in the way it is told, has the power to keep people locked in combat,
and it has an equal power to free them from suffering. Each story can leave them closer to anger
or forgiveness, toward impasse resolution, into stasis or transformation." Id. at 7.
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Truth, in conflict, is always relative to one's role in it and one's
angle of perception. This does not mean objective truth does
not exist, but that it cannot be determined by consensus. More-
over, mathematical and scientific truth rests on predictability,
which requires uniformity, but no two conflicts or perceptions
are sufficiently alike to allow for agreement, except in the most
abstract terms."
'1 12
C. No Objective Truth
Moving beyond the notion of deeply hidden truths in stories,
others have written eloquently and directly that there simply is no
such thing as "objective truth," story or not. For example, in Nar-
rative Mediation: A New Approach to Conflict Resolution,'113 John
Winslade and Gerald Monk assert:
Stories therefore are not viewed as either true or false accounts
of an objective "out there" reality. Such a view is not possible,
because events cannot be known independently of the dominant
narratives known by the knower. It is therefore more useful to
concentrate on viewing stories as constructing the world rather
than viewing the world as independently known and then de-
scribed through stories.' 14
Winslade and Monk then go on to explicitly link this vision of truth
to the postmodern philosophical movement. 1 5 As they put it:
Postmodern philosophy emphasizes the enormous variation in
how people live their lives due to the quite different discursive
contexts that surround them. Postmodern thinking suggests that
there is no single definable reality. Rather, there is great diver-
sity in the ways we make meaning in our lives. It is inevitable
that differences will result from this diversity of meaning and
that conflict will arise from time to time within or between peo-
ple .... [A]lso from a narrative point of view, conflict is likely
because people do not have direct access to the truth or to the
facts about any situation. Rather, they always view things from
a perspective, from a cultural position. Drawing on this per-
spective, they develop a story about what has happened and
continue to act into a social situation out of the story they have
created. Facts, from this perspective, are simply stories that are
112 id. at 37.
113 WINSLAI)E & MONK, supra note 1.
114 Id. at 3.
115 Id. at 41.
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generally accepted. From time to time these stories lead to dia-
metrically opposed readings of events. Again, this is not any-
one's fault. It is to be expected, given the nature of human
cultural interaction. Nevertheless, these stories have effects and
produce realities."
16
Other writers, less willing to abandon objective reality alto-
gether, nonetheless question our ability discern it. For example,
Donald Saposnek points out in Mediating Child Custody Dis-
putes'17 that "neither individual truth nor objective reality is easily
attainable in custody disputes," t11 8 and as a result, "the mediator
can succeed in resolving the dispute only if he or she adheres to the
systems point of view, in which the mediator deals with varying
degree of descriptive accuracy about the system itself."
'"19
D. Truer than Truth
I have been extremely fortunate over the years to enjoy co-
teaching mediation with our symposium host, Professor Lela P.
Love. In those trainings, she often shares the story of Charles
Drew to examine the power of narrative. In a 2000 law review
article, she summarized the importance of "stories" and draws a
distinction between "literal" and "larger" ones:
Allowing parties to tell their stories (often a story of a
wrong they have experienced) is critical to each party being able
to move beyond that experience of wrong and to listen to the
other party's story, frequently a quite different story or view-
point on the same "facts" and invariably expanding the picture
or reality that informs each individual party's perception of
events. Mediators need to understand that they must listen to
each party's story and be able to see how that party views
events, but they need not judge or determine what version of
events constitutes "fact." By preserving for each party an unin-
terrupted platform for speech, the mediator offers an important
vehicle to achieve the objectives of party empowerment and in-
traparty recognition.
116 Id.
117 DONALD T. SAPOSNEK, MEDIATING CiILiD, CUsTOiY DisPurs (revised ed. 1998).
118 Id. at 39.
119 Id.; see also JOHN W. CooLuxY, Tii MEDIATOR'S HAN1BOOK 3 (2000) (observing that
"[tihe mediator deals primarily with the subjective and is generally an active participant in the
mediation process who attempts to move the parties to reconciliation and agreement, regardless
of who or what is right or wrong.").
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The story of the death of Charles Drew illustrates that find-
ing factual truth is not necessarily the purpose of storytelling.
Charles Drew was a prominent African American physician and
scientist whose research on the use of blood plasma and whose
work in helping to establish the first American Red Cross Blood
Bank saved countless lives in World War II. Drew died after an
automobile accident in North Carolina in 1950. Many people
tell and believe the story that Drew was denied treatment and a
blood transfusion at the hospital to.which he was taken after the
accident because the black beds were full, and Drew died as a
result of this action. We can listen to that story and learn impor-
tant lessons about the indignities and tragedies suffered due to
segregation policies in the South in the first half of the 20th cen-
tury, which may be the "truth" that the speaker is trying to re-
late. In fact, the myth around Charles Drew is not historically
accurate, though it is true that many African Americans were
denied critical medical treatment. Drew received appropriate
and energetic care in the small hospital to which he was taken.
The legend around Drew, then, is not literally true but reveals a
larger truth. Such complexities lend themselves to mediation.
Although an arbitrator or neutral expert must attempt to find
"facts," a mediator must give each party the storytelling floor
and allow the parties to be shifted by the power of the other's
narrative (sometimes assisted by advocates and the translating
function of the mediator). The telling of the story shifts the
speaker; the hearing of the story potentially shifts the listener;
from a mediator's perspective, the parties, as firsthand partici-
pants, are in the best position to judge the "truth" around the
events related to their conflict. 2 '
This notion of a divide between "literal truth" and "larger truths"
captures the essence of contemporary mediation theory. It also
leaves me deeply troubled.
Just over a decade ago, Bernie Mayer made the case that
"[c]onflict resolution as a field is facing a serious crisis."'' He con-
vincingly argued, apropos of this symposium's keynote by col-
league Giuseppe De Palo urging expanded use of mandatory
mediation, that "[c]onflict resolution professionals are not signifi-
cantly involved in the major conflicts of our times."1 2 He asked us
120 Lela P. Love, Training Mediators to Listen: Deconstructing Dialogue and Constructing Un-
derstanding, Agendas, and Agreements, 38 FAM. & CONCh.. CTS. Riv. 27, 35 (2000).
121 BERNIE S. MAYEIi, BiYOND NI-rRAI.rry: CONFRONTING 'HU, CRISIS IN CoNIiicr Rrso-
I IJ'iON 3 (2004).
122 Id. at 4-5 ("People involved in conflict do not readily or naturally turn to conflict resolv-
ers. In many arenas, if mediators had to rely on people voluntarily asking for their services, they
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to "consider the possibility that the nature of the services offered
and the concept of the field currently being articulated may speak
to a narrow range of people,1 123 specifically calling out as examples
our field's concepts of neutrality and impartiality that are a poor
match for what people in conflict often want: "advice, recommen-
dations, and evaluations of their case; assistance in persuading
others; or vindication of their actions and positions. ' 124 Mayer de-
scribed how "disputants do not necessarily want resolution 1 25 and
how they "are suspicious of neutrality."'1 26 And he suggested con-
flict resolvers "overidentify our work with the third-party neutral
role, 127 which "may offer one means for creating a safe, flexible,
informal, and creative forum for interchange, but they do not offer
sufficient opportunities for voice, justice, vindication, validation, or
impact. ' 128 Finally, Mayer chastised us for being too focused on
collaborative problem solving,129 when disputants may instead
most want help "with noncollaborative approaches-ones that they
hope will further their cause, achieve victory, and give them the
chance to be heard in a powerful and decisive way."' 3 °
To Mayer's powerful case "beyond neutrality," I wish to add
that we at least should be willing to consider that people just might
also be hungry for the recognition of truth. And, by truth, I do not
mean the relativist, postmodernist framing that characterizes much
of mediation writing, theory and practice.
would have almost no business. Instead, people must be persuaded, cajoled, or mandated to use
mediation and related services.").
123 Id. at 6.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 15 ("People want to win, to build a movement, to carry on an important struggle, to
achieve meaning, to address basic issues, to gain political advantage, or other similar goals. Res-
olution implies too shallow an outcome or goal to many.").
126 Id. at 17 ("People often do not trust our neutrality. They are suspicious of the concept and
question, often correctly, whether we can genuinely be as neutral, impartial, and unbiased as we
say we are. More important perhaps, neutrality is not what people embroiled in deep conflict
are usually looking for. They want assistance, advocacy, advice, power, resources, connection, or
wisdom. We tend to rely heavily on a neutral stance to obtain trust and credibility, whereas
disputants are more inclined to accept the procedural help of a nonneutral who brings other
resources to bear and to doubt the practical usefulness of someone who is genuinely neutral.
There are times when neutrality is essential, but conflict resolvers place too much reliance on it
as a defining feature of the role we play. In many situations, if we emphasized this less, we might
actually be trusted more.").
127 MAYER, supra note 121, at 29.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 31.
130 Id. (noting that "[p]eople in conflict are often worried that the collaborative processes in
which they are urged to participate will require them to give up something of basic value or to
cooperate with what they believe to be evil or malicious").
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In an era where political polarization so routinely leads to out-
right denial of objective fact with resulting loss of personal ac-
countability,13 ' why is the mediation movement so confident that
entitlement to separate "truths" is the preferred path forward?
When dealing with uncertainty, might we be stronger as a society
with more science (with its foundational assumptions of peer re-
view, constant reevaluation and testing) 32 and more, rather than
less, reliance on time-tested principles borrowed from law, con-
cepts like shifting burdens of proof, rigorous testing of evidence
and application of socially negotiated norms?
I surface this concern profoundly aware of the considerable
body of contemporary social science supporting the notion that
"emotions, culture and world view" are intimately connected to
facts and fact perception. 33  And, though I am a civil procedure
professor, I am by no means a litigation romantic. As Scott v. Har-
131 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Cranking it Up for 2016, N.Y. TIMFS, Feb. 20, 2015, http://www
.nytimes.com/201 5/02/20/opinion/paul-krugman-cranking-up-for-2016.html ("Along with this de-
nial of reality comes an absence of personal accountability. If anything, alleged experts seem to
get points for showing that they're willing to keep saying the same things no matter how embar-
rassingly wrong they been in the past.").
132 See, e.g., Joel Achenbach, What Makes Some People So Suspicious of the Findings of Sci-
ence, GuARDIAN wIFKIy, Feb. 27, 2015, http:/www.theguardian.com/science/2015/feb/27/sci-
ence-facts-findings-method-scepticism ("It's their very detachment, what you might call the cold-
bloodedness of science, that makes science the killer app. It's the way science tells us the truth
rather than what we'd like the truth to be. Scientists can be as dogmatic as anyone else-but their
dogma is always wilting in the hot glare of new research. In science it's not a sin to change your
mind when the evidence demands it. For some people, the tribe is more important than the
truth; for the best scientists, the truth is more important than the tribe.").
133 Sheryll Cashin, Why Whites Don't See Racism: Reagan Democrats are Stephen Colbert
Democrats Now, SALON.COM (May 3, 2014), available at http://www.salon.com/2014/05/03/why-
whites dont see racism-reagan-democrats are-stephen-colbert democratsnow/ (last visited
Mar. 12, 2015) (noting that "[fiacts no longer matter in these debates" and that social science
research suggests that "people tend to reject facts that do not fit with their cognitive frames of
reference."). According to Cashin:
On matters of race, many if not most whites have a cognitive frame of reference that
suggests to them that no interventions on behalf of racial minorities are necessary.
The idea of prejudice is threatening to most whites' self-identity as nonracist. Thus
they can protect their self-identity by minimizing perceived racism. This may explain
why blacks and whites can have dramatically different perceptions about whether a
particular event, say George Zimmerman's profiling of Trayvon Martin, was moti-
vated by racism.
Id. See also Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and the Reasonable Person, 14 Li wis & CI-ARK
L. Riiv. 1455 (2010) (describing cultural cognition as "a collection of social and psychological
mechanisms that cause individuals to conform their factual beliefs to their core values and cul-
tural commitments"); Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?: Scott v.
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. R,.v. 837, 861 (2009) (noting that
cultural worldviews "matter from the standpoint of motivated cognition").
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ris134 so dramatically illustrates even a most "objective" form of
evidence-a videotape of an event-is interpreted and understood
only in a context and "from" a perspective.
1 35
Yet, this all feels too comfortable. As mediators, we give peo-
ple permission to do what they are inclined to do anyway: confront
complexity by living their own truths, rather than doing the uncom-
fortable or difficult job of sorting out reality, of separating fact
from fiction.1 36 And by giving them this permission to do so at
what is arguably one of (if not the) most contentious moments of
any individual disputant's private life, what is the implication for
society writ large when it comes to engaging in the most critical
134 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (where the majority relied on the events depicted in a
videotape to grant summary judgment and conclude that a police deputy did not violate the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against use of excessive force).
135 The majority opinion's author, Justice Antonin Scalia, stated during oral argument that
the videotape of the chase in question was "the scariest chase [he] ever saw since 'The French
Connection."' Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). This
comment immediately followed Justice Alito's observation that the tape showed plaintiff creat-
ing "a tremendous risk" for other drivers." Id. at 27. Justice Scalia's subsequent written opinion
noted, with respect to summary judgment law, that "[w]hen opposing parties tell two different
stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could
believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion
for summary judgment." Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. Justice Stevens in dissent viewed the same video
quite differently, noting "the tape actually confirms, rather than contradicts, the lower courts'
appraisal of the factual questions at issue." Id. at 390. Two years later, Dan M. Kahan, David A.
Hoffman and Donald Braman, taking up the "Scott challenge," published their fascinating study
of a diverse sample of 1350 Americans who viewed the tape. Kahan, supra note 133. Among
their conclusions:
As we predicted, there were sharp differences of perception among persons bearing
characteristics and commitments typical of two recognizable cultural styles. Individu-
als (particularly white males) who hold hierarchical and individualist cultural
worldviews, who are politically conservative, who are affluent, and who reside in the
West were likely to form significantly more pro-defendant risk perceptions. Individu-
als who hold egalitarian and communitarian views, whose politics are liberal, who are
well educated but likely less affluent, and whose ranks include disproportionately
more African Americans and women, in contrast, were significantly more likely to
form pro-plaintiff views and to reject the conclusion that the police acted reasonably
in using deadly force to terminate the chase. The conspicuous competition between
these recognizable cultural styles (or "status collectivities") on issues ranging from
gun control to climate change, from abortion to the death penalty, attests to the
power of the images reflected in the Scott tape to provoke perceptions protective of
observers' identities.
Id. at 879 (footnotes omitted).
136 See generally DAN117L KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SI.ow 31 (2011) (drawing a dis-
tinction between System I thinking (fast, intuitive, and emotional) and System 2 thinking
(slower, more deliberative, and more logical) and noting that "[t]he defining feature of System 2,
in this story, is that its operations are effortful, and one of it main characteristics is laziness, a
reluctance to invest more effort than is strictly necessary.").
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public policy issues of our time-almost all of which are character-
ized by uncertainty?
CONCLUSION
In my fellow panelist's brilliant TedTalk video, "Mediation and
Mindfully Getting in the Middle"'' 37 (which should in my view, be
required viewing for all students and practitioners of mediation),
Brad Heckman invokes F. Scott Fitzgerald for the proposition that
being open to differing truths is at the core of mediation. As
Heckman puts it (with delightful drawings of Fitzgerald and a pair
of ducks in the video version, the latter offered up as a playful pun
on the closing word of the quote):
This is F. Scott Fitzgerald who once said that the sign of a first
rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in their
head and maintain the ability to function and then I think Hem-
ingway punched him in the mouth. This is very much the core of
mediation and so [is] the idea of holding two differing truths at
the same time. So when I struggle with mindfulness in media-
tion, I think of F. Scott Fitzgerald playing with that paradox.
138
Taking Heckman to heart, I simultaneously recognize the
power of narrative, of the "fairy-tales" of storytelling but also ask
us to confront the potential ugliness of mediation's postmodern
"surrender" of objective fact. This particular ugly characteristic is
not an ironic and perhaps inevitable result of institutionalization
("barnacles"), or a predictable and virulent concentration of power
that comes with aging systems ("aristocracy"). Mediation's central
abandonment of fact is arguably what often allows it to succeed, at
least in the sense of helping parties to reach "resolution." But in
my view it comes at an extremely high cost, in a form of potential
contagion. The complete surrender of truth as a seminal feature of
one of ADR's most popular private processes, however well inten-
tioned, may be setting us up for failure in our public disputing and
decision-making. And, I fear it is a surrender that will be hard to
back away from.
137 Brad Heckman, Mediation and Mindfully Getting in the Middle, TEDxTeachersCollege,
YouTuHE (Aug. 18, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UUVmPVKaJzk.
138 Id. at 1:25-1:55.
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